中国航空：航空的祈祷

中国的航空公司无力从飞速增长的业务中取利

尽管空中客车公司的巨型客机A380在展出中振人心魄，本周参观于2月21日开幕的亚洲航空展的嘉宾们却把目光向北投去。亚洲航空展在新加坡Changi展览中心已经持续了25年，明年它将搬到香港去。为什么呢？当然就是这些日子以来，中国展现出巨大发展力啦

对于印度、迪拜和东南亚各国而言，这无疑是个激动人心的好消息。而拿航空业来说，中国的业务量大、增长也快，使其成为真正的大赢家。去年中国航空公司运载 了一亿三千八百万名乘客，是五年前的两倍。中国从此成为美国之后第二大航空市场。中国政府希望这个数字可以在今后的五年里再翻一倍。货物的运输量也在飞快 增长，较去年上涨20％。

因此，中国前所未有的大买飞机。在2005年，她购入了219架飞机，也就是达到空中客车公司全球最高一年订单量整整1/5的份额。波音公司最新的分析预计在未来的20年里，中国会购入共价值2130亿的2600架新飞机

但是正当机身制造商和他们的供应商摩拳擦掌之际，中国的航空公司正面临着无利润业务增长。的确，中国奇迹般地动员了全国人们支持航空业，建立了支持航空业 增长地基础设施，同时也提高了其安全性。中国现在每年的运载超过100万的飞机场有130个，在2020年前计划再建55个国际机场。虽然乘客的数量和航 空的收入都有大幅度的增长，但是整个部门的收益在过去的五年里只占100亿元（12亿美金）中的一小部分。

今年，中国航空公司是三大航空公司中唯一盈利的。中国南方航空和东方航空公司受到了巨大损失。虽然他们的美国竞敌面临着更加严重的财政危机，但是与此大相 径庭的是其他的亚洲航空公司，像香港的泰国航空公司和新加坡航空公司。尤其是中国努力将它众多的小航空公司合并为六个较大的航空公司后，他们大为获利。与 亚洲其它航空公司在走低成本路线上的日益成功相比，中国公司在这方面却不尽如人意。她的奥凯、春秋和鹰联航空公司也在苦苦地挣扎。

航空公司的部分亏损源于快速的扩张。购置了那么多的新飞机意味着中国的航空公司负债严重。更严历的问题是，虽然在过去的几年里，中国是一个半自由的国家， 但是她仍然受到政府永久控制。比如说，飞机票的价格或多或少地受到控制，阻止她的航空公司运用西方同行的先进的收益管理模式。政府打算提高各航空公司土地 的租金，以淘汰国内亏损的中小型飞机场。虽然还是有很多航空公司的存在，但是这个措施会进一步击垮国内的航空公司。同时，国内的飞机燃料的垄断使得燃料费 用占了中国航空公司平均总开销的40％，而全球范围内的航空公司的燃料费用只占24％。

还有一个问题就是由缺乏合格的工作人员所带来的劳动力的涨价。尤其是在将来的10年里，中国需要一千多名飞行员。而在靠近四川成都的广汉市，中国唯一的飞 行学校，最多也只能训练出600名学员。中国航空承认这个月计划购入20到30架2006年造的新飞机，条件是为他们配备人手。供应商们意识到这个问题。 空中客车公司在北京建了一个训练中心，像波音公司一样在那里到处安装模拟器。当中国南方航空公司在澳大利亚建立训练中心时，中国也允许建立一些私人的训练 学校。严重的人力缺乏使得中国的航空公司现在不停地招收新人，不得已就从外国聘请飞行员。这样不但有损他们的民族自尊心，而且还在外国人员上面花费了更多 的财力。

他们微薄的利润、不清不楚的扩张计划甚至让航空公司受到了短暂的交易增长的下滑。挽救现在的局面也是可以的。其一，进一步合并以降低高额的费用。其二，解 放价格和燃料市场。让外国的经营者推动发展就是大胆的一招。其三，中国航空与香港的泰国航空和港龙航空反复推敲的三方合并将会展开最好的业务和开创世界一 流的航空公司。不管中国政府选其中哪一条，都要速战速决。毕竟，从恐怖分子的攻击到非典，航空业每3年至少遭受1次大打击。已经过了两年的好日子，下次的 打击还远吗？

翻译：halent1689

原文：Chinese aviation: On a wing and a prayer

China's airlines are failing to translate rapid growth into profits

DESPITE a rousing flying display from the gigantic new Airbus A380（注释1）, visitors at this week's Asian Aerospace show, which opened on February 21st, were looking to the north as much as up. After a quarter of a century at Singapore's Changi Exhibition Centre, Asian Aerospace—the world's third biggest air show—will move to Hong Kong from next year. The reason, as so often these days, is the growing pull of China.

Granted, there is excitement about India, Dubai and south-east Asia. But for the aerospace industry, China's combination of rapid growth and huge absolute numbers is the real prize. Chinese airlines carried 138m passengers last year, a number that has doubled in the past five years and already turned the mainland into the second largest aviation market behind America. The Chinese government expects the figure to double again over the next five years. Freight volumes are growing even faster, increasing by 20% last year

As a result, China is buying aircraft as never before. In 2005, it accounted for 219 planes, or fully one- fifth of Airbus's global orders in a record year. Boeing's latest analysis forecasts that over the next two decades, China will need 2,600 new planes, worth more than $213 billion.

But while airframe-makers and their suppliers are rubbing their hands, China's airlines are so far experiencing almost profitless growth. True, China has done wonders to mobilise the country, building the infrastructure needed to support the growth of its aviation industry and improving its safety. China now has 130 airports handling more than 1m passengers a year, with another 55 international airports planned by 2020. But despite a big jump in passenger numbers and revenues, the entire sector has reported measly profits of just 10 billion yuan ($1.2 billion) in the past five years.

This year, Air China is the only one of the big three carriers expected to be in the black. China Southern and China Eastern have already warned of sharp losses. While their American rivals are in even worse financial straits, this performance compares badly with other highly profitable Asian carriers, such as Cathay Pacific and Singapore Airlines—particularly since China has worked hard to consolidate its numerous carriers to six bigger ones. Nor is China having much luck with low-cost carriers, which are a growing success elsewhere in Asia. Its own versions—Okay Airways, Air Spring and United Eagle—are struggling

Part of the airlines' failure to make profits is simply the consequence of rapid expansion. Investing in all those new planes means most Chinese airlines are heavily in debt. A more serious issue, despite limited liberalisation over the past few years, is the continued presence of the state's dead hand（注释2）. Ticket prices, for example, remain more or less regulated, preventing carriers from practising the sophisticated yield management of western peers. The government is planning to raise landing charges for domestic airlines in order to bail out (注释 3) the country's loss-making small and medium-sized airports, of which there are still far too many—but that will further squeeze the domestic carriers. Meanwhile, a domestic jet-fuel monopoly means fuel accounts for an average of 40% of costs at Chinese airlines, compared with 24% for airlines worldwide.

Another issue is rising labour costs due to a lack of qualified staff. In particular, China will need more than 1,000 pilots a year over the next decade, but with only one state flying school, Guanghan near Chengdu in Sichuan province, it can train 600 at most. Air China admitted this month that its planned introduction of 20-30 new aircraft in 2006 depended on it being able to man them. The suppliers are aware of this problem. Airbus has a training centre in Beijing and is setting up simulators elsewhere—as is Boeing. China is also allowing some private training schools to spring up, while China Southern already has its own training centre in Australia. But the shortage is acute and Chinese airlines are now talking of recruiting, reluctantly, pilots from overseas. Not only do they regard this as a blow to national pride; foreign crews also cost more

Their weak profitability, coupled with ambitious plans to expand capacity, leaves the mainland carriers exposed to even a temporary slowdown in traffic growth. Further consolidation, allowing an attack on their structurally high costs, is one remedy. Another would be to liberalise the market for both fares and fuel. A braver step would be to let in foreign operators to boost competition. Finally, the oft-speculated three-way merger of Hong Kong's Cathay Pacific and Dragonair with Air China would create a world-class carrier and spread best practice. Whichever route the government chooses, it needs to act rapidly. After all, the industry has been hit by at least one major shock every three years, from terrorist attacks to the SARS virus. After a couple of good years, the next bad one is due some time soon.